Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Faculty Publications - College of Christian Studies

College of Christian Studies

2013

Wolterstorff on Love and Justice: An Augustinian
Response
Joseph Clair
George Fox University, jclair@georgefox.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ccs
Part of the Christianity Commons
Recommended Citation
Clair, Joseph, "Wolterstorff on Love and Justice: An Augustinian Response" (2013). Faculty Publications - College of Christian Studies.
Paper 169.
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ccs/169

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Christian Studies at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - College of Christian Studies by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox
University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.

WOLTERSTORFF ON LOVE AND JUSTICE
An Augustinian Response
Joseph Clair
ABSTRACT
In Justice in Love, Nicholas Wolterstorff argues for a unique ethical orientation called “care-agapism.” He offers it as an alternative to theories of
benevolence-agapism found in Christian ethics on the one hand and to the
philosophical orientations of egoism, utilitarianism, and eudaimonism on the
other. The purported uniqueness and superiority of his theory lies in its
ability to account for the conceptual compatibility of love and justice while
also positively incorporating self-love. Yet in attempting to articulate a
“bestowed worth” account of human dignity—in which dignity is given by
divine love and respected in acts of justice—Wolterstorff leans on an unstable characterization of how love and the good are conceptually interwoven.
As a result, his reader cannot be sure about the theoretical superiority of
care-agapism. Moreover, Wolterstorff’s attempt to value self-love and at the
same time reject eudaimonism depends on a dubious interpretation of
Augustine carried over from Justice: Rights and Wrongs, which itself further
depends on a mischaracterization of the possible varieties of eudaimonism.
This mistake is unfortunate because, on a closer reading of Augustine, one
finds an agapistic account of eudaimonism that could have significantly
helped Wolterstorff’s overall account of the complementary relation of love
and justice.
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1. Introduction
Love and justice pervade Western intellectual culture and have histories that run all the way back to ancient Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome.
The concepts deal, in different ways, with the enduring and difficult
question of one’s concern for the well-being of others. Yet the imperatives
to do justice and love your neighbor have often been portrayed as standing

in fundamental conflict: one seen as prudential and austere and the other
as always generous and forgiving. Nicholas Wolterstorff’s thesis in Justice
in Love is simple: any apparent conceptual conflict between the requirements of justice and the requirement to love is precisely that—a merely
apparent conflict (2011,1). Wolterstorff’s goal is twofold: to diffuse the
notion that these concepts are mutually exclusive and, indeed, to elucidate
their profound compatibility. Still, the book’s title testifies to Wolterstorff’s
conviction that love ultimately takes priority. He argues that love both can
and should incorporate justice, and that justice must be seen as an
essential aspect of acting lovingly (2011, 93). He calls this incorporative
conception of justice in love “care.” Hence Wolterstorff designates a unique
ethical orientation: “care-agapism.”1
The compatibility of love and justice is of more than theoretical interest
to Wolterstorff. In the preface to Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Justice in
Love’s predecessor and companion volume), Wolterstorff regrets that his
discussion of justice as inherent human rights became so expansive in
that book that “there was no room left to discuss the relation between love
and justice” (2008b, xiii). He promises to provide such an account and
claims that doing so is critical because “large swaths of American
Christians”—people within his own religious tradition—“believe that in
the New Testament love supplanted justice” and point to the fact that,
“Jesus did not teach that we are to treat people justly; he taught that we
are to love our neighbors as ourselves” (2008b, 1). Insofar as “Americans
continue to be a religious people, dominantly Christian,” this popular
notion of love supplanting justice has pernicious “consequences for our
culture and society as a whole” (2008b, 1). Of particular concern to
Wolterstorff is the phenomenon of domination disguising itself as love.
Wolterstorff reports one particularly vivid example of this phenomenon
drawn from his experience of the effects of apartheid in South Africa in
1976. Wolterstorff’s fear is that severing the commanded love of scripture

1 Although the term care-agapism is unique to Wolterstorff, the attempt to demonstrate
the compatibility of love and justice is far from novel. One weakness in the text is
Wolterstorff’s failure to consider other Christian ethicists who have also perceived the need
to show the compatibility of these concepts. Paul Tillich’s presentation of agapic love as
“creative justice” in Morality and Beyond is complementary to Wolterstorff’s account of
care-love and provides a nice counterpoint to the incompatibility accounts found in the work
of Anders Nygren and Reinhold Niebuhr (two authors Wolterstorff considers). More recent
work by Gene Outka (1972), Margaret Farley (2006), and Timothy P. Jackson (2003) defends
the view that agapic love and justice must conceptually work hand-in-hand in the construction of a distinctively Christian social and political ethics. Although Wolterstorff’s careagapism rests on a different argument for the compatibility of love and justice than these
authors, nevertheless, the uniqueness of his position, and the force of his argument, could
have been significantly strengthened by some engagement with other compatibility accounts
in Christian ethics. (Outka’s work is mentioned only in passing on pages 21 and 25.)

from the language of justice (especially justice as rights) diminishes
Christians’ capacity to distinguish appeals to love from tools of
domination.2
Wolterstorff has two groups of interlocutors in view in Justice in Love:
philosophical and theological ethicists. To the former, he presents his
version of agapism as yet another alternative to what he takes to be the
three dominant “ethical orientations most commonly discussed by philosophers [today]: namely, egoism, eudaimonism, and utilitarianism” (2011,
1).3 To the latter group, he presents his care-agapism as a superior
alternative to rival versions of agapism. In sections one and two of the
book, he distinguishes care-agapism from what he sees as the prominent
twentieth-century alternative, “benevolence-agapism,” represented in the
writings of Anders Nygren and Reinhold Niebuhr. Whereas Wolterstorff’s
care-agapism attempts to reveal justice and love as compatible with one
another, benevolence-agapism emphasizes the inherent incompatibility of
the two.4 In section three, Wolterstorff analyzes cases of perceived conflict
between love and justice in order to allay the worry that an ethical
orientation of love invites and legitimates certain modes of domination or
victimization. In anticipating such concerns, he considers three particular
cases of perceived conflict: forgiveness, generosity, and benevolent paternalism. In the fourth and final section of the book, Wolterstorff provides
2 For a detailed account of the biographical and personal dimension of Wolterstorff’s work
on love and justice, see Wolterstorff 2008a. Wolterstorff claims that his recent two-volume
project is an attempt to give theoretical expression to a concept of justice that he took for
granted and applied to concrete social issues almost thirty years ago in Until Justice and
Peace Embrace (Wolterstorff 1983). See Wolterstorff 2008b, ix.
3 It is striking that a Kantian position does not make Wolterstorff’s list of alternatives.
In what sense does Wolterstorff understand the ethical imperatives to do justice and love
your neighbor to be obligations akin to the Kantian sense of duty? Wolterstorff argues that
in Søren Kierkegaard’s treatment of the love command in Works of Love—a canonical text
for the whole agapist tradition—one hears “unmistakable echoes of Kant,” but pursues the
matter no further (2011, 27n10). For this reason, to pursue the question of Wolterstorff’s
deontological presentation of the love command is beyond the scope of this present essay.
4 Another weakness in the text is the lack of attention given to the development of
agapism after Nygren and Niebuhr. According to Wolterstorff, the “benevolence-agapism” of
Nygren and Niebuhr is representative of modern day agapism as a whole. Although a few
other modern day agapists make the list (for example, Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, Paul
Ramsey), Wolterstorff claims that they all, ultimately, offer incompatibility accounts of the
relation between love and justice. Indeed, he makes the stronger claim that “modern day
agapism is incapable of giving a satisfactory account of how justice fits into an agapist
framework” (2011, 104, emphasis mine). This identification of modern day agapism with the
views of Nygren and Niebuhr, and the stronger claim about agapism’s incapability, raises
questions about Wolterstorff’s characterization of the movement. Wolterstorff’s book may
give the false impression that the modern day agapism of Nygren and Niebuhr is representative of the movement as a whole. This works as a foil for his own position, yet it ignores
a number of authors laboring in the field of Christian love ethics who explicitly reject Nygren
and Niebuhr.

a novel interpretation of the Apostle Paul’s doctrine of justification in the
book of Romans, arguing that Paul’s overarching theme is actually the
justice of God’s generosity toward humankind. In this essay, I focus on
the theoretical framework of Wolterstorff’s care-agapism as it is laid out
in the first two sections of the book.
Wolterstorff argues that his care-agapism differs from benevolenceagapism in several theoretically advantageous ways. Chief among these
are (a) its account of the compatibility of love and justice as ethical
concepts and (b) its ability to incorporate self-love into a conception of
care-love. In the first section of this review, I will assess Wolterstorff’s
account of the compatibility of love and justice, paying particular attention to the notion of the good presupposed therein. That account is
ultimately rooted in a “bestowed worth” account of human dignity, which
he first articulated in Justice: Rights and Wrongs. His elaborate theistic
account of human dignity is based on a description of the relationship
between love and the good that is more perplexing than illuminating; for
this reason a verdict on the theoretical superiority of Wolterstorff’s vision
is, in the end, divided and uncertain. In the second section, I will consider
Wolterstorff’s twofold attempt both to incorporate self-love into careagapism and reject eudaimonism. The potential success of this twofold
maneuver is directly connected to his perplexing description of the relationship between love and the good, and I suggest that Wolterstorff has
mischaracterized the possible varieties of eudaimonism through a misleading interpretation of a key historical figure, Augustine of Hippo. This
interpretation is problematic and unfortunate because, contrary to Wolterstorff’s suggestion, Augustine’s Christian Platonism is a eudaimonistic
resource within Wolterstorff’s own tradition that could have actually
strengthened his overall account of the complementary relationship
between love and justice.

2. The Compatibility of Love and Justice
According to Wolterstorff, the worrisome Christian perception of love
supplanting justice finds sophisticated theoretical expression in the
agapism of Nygren and Niebuhr. For both authors, the commanded love of
the New Testament, agapē, is “the love of pure impartial benevolence,”
akin only to God’s own love (2008b, 1). Both conceive of agapic love as
radically altruistic, benevolent, beneficent, charitable, self-sacrifical, and
as being isolated from other forms of love like friendship and romantic
love, which are summarily construed as “natural” or “preferential” and
in distinct conflict with the radically benevolent requirements of agapic
“neighbor-love” (2011, 23–27). Both portray the gentle benevolence of
the agapic love taught and embodied by Jesus as incompatible with
the sometimes rough, prudential, austere, and often self-protective

requirements of justice and both claim, in different ways, that wherever
agapic love is found, “the order of justice is obsolete and invalidated”
(Nygren 1953, 90).5 The salient difference between Nygren’s and Niebuhr’s
agapism only emerges in terms of the practical conclusions that each draw
from this inherent incompatibility.
When justice and love are seen to be in conflict, Nygren proposes that
one should prefer love to justice. By contrast, Niebuhr proposes that one
prefer justice to love, accepting the tragic hue of life in the here and now.
The alternative, says Niebuhr, is to run the unacceptable risk of inviting
and legitimating modes of domination and victimization in the name of
agapic love. Nygren and Niebuhr share the assumption that justice and
love may be in conflict even when love is completely well-formed, though
they endorse differing practical ethics. “Nygren instructs one to remain
faithful to love in situations of conflict, even at the cost of injustice;
Niebuhr instructs one to remain faithful to justice in situations of conflict,
even at the cost of love,” but for Wolterstorff, “[b]oth positions prove
untenable” (2011, 72).6
Wolterstorff, then, presents an “understanding of love such that the
imperative to act justly is not in conflict with the law of love, not a
restriction thereon, not even a supplement, but such that doing justice is
an example of love” (2011, 84). “Care,” Wolterstorff argues, joins the two
aspects of love that Nygren and Niebuhr separate (2011, 101). Love as
“care” both seeks to enhance someone else’s well-being and to secure her
just treatment (2011, 101).7
5

Citation is found in Wolterstorff 2008b, 1.
Throughout the text Wolterstorff calls Nygren’s position “classical modern day agapism”
claiming that it is more representative of the tradition as a whole. Niebuhr’s practical
emphasis on remaining faithful to justice over love in the meantime stands outside of the
mainstream of the tradition. See chapter five: “Niebuhr’s Non-Classical Agapism.” This
practical difference between Nygren and Niebuhr turns out to be insignificant, for Wolterstorff, insofar as both offer incompatibility accounts of the two concepts. One way to respond
to Wolterstorff’s strong claim that modern day agapism is incapable of providing a satisfactory account of the relation between love and justice is to challenge his reading of key figures
like Nygren and Niebuhr. This approach is less promising with Nygren who is forthrightly
an incompatibilist. The case of Reinhold Niebuhr is more complicated. Niebuhr’s dialectical
account of the eschatological relation between the ideal of agapic love (for the individual) and
social justice (at the group-level) found in Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) is not—or
at least is not straightforwardly—an incompatibility account. Nor is it Niebuhr’s mature
account of love’s relation to justice. See Flescher 2000. I will not pursue an interpretive
response to Wolterstorff’s reading of Niebuhr here. My point is to highlight that both
Wolterstorff’s selection of interlocutors and his reading of key texts raises questions about his
claim that all modern day agapists offer straightforward incompatibility accounts.
7
Wolterstorff notes that his appeal to the concept of love as care has no theoretical
relationship to the relevant literature in the field commonly known as care ethics. See 2011,
103–4. Here is another case where Wolterstorff’s position could have been clarified and
strengthened by some encounter with other Christian ethicists who have engaged the
6

Defining love as care promises the best possibility of a defensible
agapism, Wolterstorff argues, because its rule of application encompasses
the broadest range of love-objects and also identifies one’s varying responsibilities to others within that range. Its rule of application therefore can
aid one in identifying whose well-being one is responsible for promoting
and under what conditions (2011, 104). Certainly, agapic love can, for
Wolterstorff, drive one to more extravagant and selfless displays of promoting the well-being of a neighbor (even a foreigner, stranger, enemy, or
previously unknown neighbor, as in the case of the Good Samaritan), but
it does not do so without providing an account of the worth and dignity of
every human individual and their basic rights.8 To respect these qualities
of a human being, as one does in love, is primary justice. Thus, for
Wolterstorff, love does justly.9
2.1 Love, justice, and the good
In the fourteenth chapter of Justice in Love, entitled “Love, Justice, and
the Good,” Wolterstorff notes a key distinction between care-love and
benevolence-love (2011, 142). While each form of love represents a concern
to promote the well-being of another as an end in itself, care-love also
seeks to fulfill the requirements of justice—that is, it also ensures that
others be treated in a manner commensurate with their worth. This
further entailment of love as justice restrictively conditions how one may
promote the good. And in doing so, it abates injustice wreaked in the name
of malformed love.
“Much of the vagueness and confusion that one finds in discussions
about love,” Wolterstorff says, “has its source in failure to get clear on just
which sort of love is under consideration” (2011, 142). Thus, in order to
gain clarity on the relationship between love and justice, he provides a
short list of the basic types or forms of love. In addition to benevolencelove and care-love, he introduces attraction-love, attachment-love,
advantage-love (self-love), and friendship-love. This list is not intended to
relevant secular authors (for example, Carol Gilligan and Virginia Held) and employed the
concept in order to bring together the language of love and justice. For a helpful, if somewhat
dated, overview of the literature in feminist Christian ethics see Tanner 1996. For a more
recent Augustinian engagement with feminist care ethics (both secular and Christian
varieties) see Gregory 2008, 149–96.
8 Wolterstorff’s interpretations of Jesus’s Parable of the Good Samaritan sprinkled
throughout the text are highly nuanced and insightful meditations on the Pharisee’s
question: “Who then is my neighbor?” See, for example, Wolterstorff 2011, 131–33.
9 In chapter seven of Justice in Love, entitled “What Is Justice?,” Wolterstorff provides an
account of primary justice as respect for inherent human rights, which is a condensed
version of his argument in Justice: Rights and Wrongs. The account in chapter seven of
Justice in Love emphasizes the relationship between primary justice as respect for inherent
human rights and love as “care.”

be exhaustive but rather to illustrate a more primary point about the
relationship between love and the good: all forms of love are manifestations of one or more of “three fundamental orientations toward the good”
(2011, 142). These orientations are benefaction, acknowledgment, and
investment (2011, 142–45).
The first orientation, benefaction, consists in seeking to promote,
enhance, or to bring about the good of another. Seeking to promote or
enhance the good of another “with no consideration of whether or not
justice requires [it]” is most closely associated with benevolence-love. It is
this manifestation of love “that the modern day agapist movement mistakenly identified with New Testament agape,” which explains why Wolterstorff labels the modern day agapism expressed by Nygren and Niebuhr
“benevolence-agapism” (2011, 143).
The second orientation toward the good, acknowledgment, is closely
associated with attraction-love insofar as one’s attention or interest is
often a form of acknowledging the good in someone or something (2011,
143–44). The third and final orientation, investment, is integrally linked
to attachment-love. It speaks to the vulnerable and contingent nature of
one’s relationship toward the good in general and to the dangerous
vulnerability the lover experiences when emotional investment in the
good of another person is particular and deep (2011, 144–45). “The
emotional investment lying at the heart of attachment is what makes one
susceptible to worry, sorrow, grief, and the like—and open to elation.
When the life of the person to whom one is attached seems threatened,
one worries; when he dies, one grieves” (2011, 144–45).10
Wolterstorff then illustrates the potential unity of these orientations
and thereby elucidates the compatibility of love and justice in “care-love”:
Rendering to someone what justice requires because justice requires it is at
one and the same time a manifestation of that orientation toward the good
that is benefaction and of that orientation toward the good that is acknowledgment. To treat the other justly is to advance her life-good in some respect;
that is benefaction. It is also to pay her what due respect for her worth
requires; that is acknowledgment. In doing justice, benefaction and acknowledgment are united. And because care incorporates acting justly, care likewise unites benefaction with acknowledgment. (2011, 144)

Thus does Wolterstorff argue that the various orientations within love
can be united. This conception of agapē as care-love decidedly parts ways
with both Nygren’s and Niebuhr’s benevolence-agapism, where all varieties of erōs (for example, attraction-love, admiration-love, etc.) are sharply
10 Wolterstorff’s profound meditation on grief after losing his son comes to mind. See
Wolterstorff 1987.

opposed to agapē. “By incorporating justice, care joins with eros as a
manifestation of that orientation toward the good which is acknowledgment” (2011, 144).
2.2 The role of bestowed worth in Wolterstorff’s account of the
compatibility of love and justice
To treat someone justly in the mode of care-love, for Wolterstorff, is both
to advance an individual’s well-being (benefaction) and also “to pay her
what due respect for her worth requires; that is acknowledgment” (2011,
144). Yet one must ask what this “worth” consists in as a predicate of
humanity and determine who exactly are its bearers. Is it rooted in a
unique property of human nature—that is, in a certain human capacity or
possibly a resemblance to the divine (as expressed in the traditional
formulation, imago dei)? Wolterstorff’s answer is that human worth is
rooted in neither of these things but instead in the unconditional love of
God for humankind. Therefore, in order to complete his account of carelove (acting justly) in chapter fourteen of Justice in Love, Wolterstorff
offers a reprise of his unique “bestowed worth” account of human dignity
found in chapter sixteen of Justice: Rights and Wrongs (2008b, chap. 16;
2011, see also 145–57) In both texts Wolterstorff argues that “the conviction that God loves each and every human being equally and forever
provides those who hold that conviction with a distinct way of grounding
natural human rights” in human dignity (2011, 145; see also 2008b,
chap. 14.).
In chapter fourteen of Justice in Love Wolterstorff brings his bestowed
worth account of human dignity together with his account of the varieties
of love (and their underlying unity as manifestations of one or more of the
three fundamental orientations toward the good) in order to give a precise
definition of the nature of the divine love that bestows special worth on
human beings. In bringing these elements together, an important difference between Wolterstorff’s care-agapism and benevolence-agapism
emerges with regard to the definition of the nature of divine love for
humankind and the orientation(s) toward the good that it manifests.
As mentioned above, for Nygren and Niebuhr, divine love is pure
benevolence-love, unadulterated benefaction. Against this view, Wolterstorff claims that the God portrayed in scripture exhibits all three of the
fundamental orientations (benefaction, acknowledgment, and investment)
toward the goodness of creation (2011, 143–45). In particular, Wolterstorff
emphasizes God’s admiration of creation’s inherent goodness in the
opening chapter of Genesis (2011, 143). This scriptural depiction of divine
love is meant to distinguish his view from that found in modern agapism:
[T]here is in the modern day agapists an unmistakable reluctance to say
much about God’s creative activity. The picture that emerges from Nygren’s

Agape and Eros is that of human beings somehow already on the scene,
lacking all worth, doing wrong, and of God then forgiving them for their
wrongdoing and thereby creating in them the worth of being loved by God in
the mode of forgiveness. A curious picture indeed! Escaping from the conundra and paradoxes of modern day agapism require[s] rejecting the assumption that all divine love is to be understood on the model of God’s forgiveness
of the sinner. God’s forgiveness of the sinner is but one manifestation of
God’s care; God’s care is but one manifestation of God’s benefaction; and
God’s benefaction is but one mode of God’s orientation toward the good.
(2011, 143)

Nygren’s picture of divine love on the model of forgiveness presupposes
no worth in the individual to be enhanced—it posits the creation of worth
ex nihilo. The key distinction between agapē and erōs is that the latter
manifests exclusively as an orientation toward the acquisitive goods of
appraisal whereas the former manifests as pure bestowal.11 On this
account, God’s love is distinguished from all modes of acquisitive
appraisal: as agapē it remains unadulterated in its creative activity of
value-bestowal. Wolterstorff’s depiction of divine love therefore certainly
takes more into account than does Nygren’s. Still, one may ask which form
or type of divine love is responsible for bestowing the requisite worth on
human beings that is to be acknowledged in care-love.
Love as attraction will not do the work required since, rather than bestowing
worth, such love acknowledges the worth already there. Love as benevolence
or benefaction fares no better. Such love may well bring about the enhancement of the worth of its object. But what we are looking for is not a form of
love that causes or brings about enhancement of worth but one that as such
bestows worth on its object. It’s the being loved that gives one the worth, not
what the love causes. (2011, 153)

It turns out that attachment-love, a manifestation of the third orientation toward the good which Wolterstorff calls investment, is the divine
love that “bestows worth” on human beings. This bestowed worth alone is
the source and ground of ineradicable human dignity, for Wolterstorff. And
it is precisely this worth that is to be acknowledged by other human
beings in the activity of care. Care, then, names the activity and attitude
that reflects the deep compatibility of love as bestowal and justice as
appraisal.
This third orientation toward the good of investment—in the form of
attachment-love—distinguishes Wolterstorff’s account from Nygren’s.
11 For Nygren agapē always bestows or creates worth in its object whereas erōs only
recognizes worth and acquisitively desires it. See Nygren 1953, 208–10. It is Nygren’s view
of the nature of divine love, and not Niebuhr’s, that receives all the attention in chapter
fourteen and serves as the foil for Wolterstorff’s own bestowed worth account of human
dignity.

Nygren has no third orientation toward the good beyond appraisal and
bestowal. The question becomes: what is the relationship between
Nygren’s category of worth-bestowal and Wolterstorff’s investment orientation toward the good? One obvious difference is that Nygren’s worthbestowal is modeled after divine forgiveness in a way that Wolterstorff’s
“investment” is not. On the other hand, there is this important similarity:
Wolterstorff’s account of divine attachment-love does not presuppose or
require any preexisting worth on the part of the beloved to be acknowledged or enhanced. The act of love is itself what vests worth in the other
and establishes the rubric for all acts of justice. In this important sense,
Wolterstorff’s investment can be as free and spontaneous as Nygren’s
bestowal.
As an alternative to the forgiveness model of divine, worth-bestowing
love, Wolterstorff offers an analogy to illustrate the investment orientation
of divine attachment-love: the relationship between a monarch and his/her
friends. In a crucial passage in Justice: Rights and Wrongs that summarizes his argument for bestowed worth, Wolterstorff first introduces this
analogy:
In short, if love bestows worth, it has to be love as attachment that does this
. . . let us suppose that [a Queen] befriends someone in her realm, becomes
attached to her. This quite clearly bestows a certain worth on the one
befriended . . . others will be envious; they regard the mere status of being
a friend of the queen as enviable . . . I conclude that if God loves a human
being with the love of attachment, that love bestows great worth on that
human being. . . . And I conclude that if God loves, in the mode of attachment, each and every human being equally and permanently, then natural
inherent human rights inhere in the worth bestowed on human beings by
that love. (2008b, 359–60)12

This account of bestowed worth results in two sorts of unanswered critical
questions. First, in what sense does the goodness of this bestowed worth
inhere in the human individual herself—that is, does bestowed worth
actually ground an account of human dignity and its corresponding rights
or does it ground divine rights with respect to human beings?13 To use the
language of the analogy, by honoring the Queen’s friend, does one respect
the inherent worth of the friend, or simply the worth of the Queen?
Second, if a viable account of human dignity can make no appeal
12
I leave to the side Wolterstorff’s detailed account of the various “natural inherent
human rights” in Justice: Rights and Wrongs and focus, in this case, on his general account
of the worth bestowed on human beings by divine attachment-love that accounts for human
dignity.
13 Paul Weithman articulates this first sort of critical question for Wolterstorff’s “theistic
account” of human dignity in Weithman 2009, 259. Wolterstorff replies to Weithman’s
critique at Wolterstorff 2009, 274–75.

to human capacities14—that is, if only an account of bestowed, relational
worth, granted solely through something on the model of God’s unconditional attachment-love for humankind can ground human dignity, as
Wolterstorff argues—then might this bestowed worth be arbitrary?15 That
would be a “curious picture indeed!” To reply, Wolterstorff notes that,
“Most secular attempts at grounding [human rights] . . . are dignity-based
approaches; and most of these, in turn, locate human dignity in certain
capacities” (2011b, 340). It is this appeal to fragile, degradable capacities
that is the fatal flaw in most secular accounts of human dignity, he thinks.
“What one needs for a theistic account of human dignity,” by contrast, “is
some worth-imparting relation of human beings to God that does not
in any way involve reference to human capacities. Being loved by God is
such a relation” (2011, 352). Wolterstorff’s rigorous attempt to provide a
secure account of human dignity that avoids the pitfalls of capacitiesbased approaches, however, also makes it vulnerable to the threat of
arbitrariness.
In response to the first question, Wolterstorff attempts to explain how
bestowed worth is imparted to human individuals in such a way that it
inheres in them and becomes uniquely their own and thus grounds
inherent natural human rights from within, as it were. In order to clarify
the nature of this impartation, he reprises the story of the monarch, now
in Justice in Love:
[I]magine a monarch. He’s a good monarch, loved by all his subjects; he
bestows on all of them the great good of a just political order that serves the
common good. But he’s rather lonely. So in addition to being a benefactor to
all his subjects, he decides to choose a few of his subjects as people that he
would like to be friends with . . . to be chosen as one with whom the king
would like to be a friend is an honor . . . And now for the crucial point. To
be honored is to have worth bestowed on one. (2011, 154–55)

Wolterstorff uses the honor bestowed in being the monarch’s friend to
depict the intangible, yet no less real, property imparted through
attachment-love to the beloved object in such a way that the value
imparted becomes the object’s very own possession—it inheres in the
relationship. This revised version of the analogy, however, immediately
invites the second question: in this case, is the monarch’s decision to select
certain friends purely arbitrary? Wolterstorff argues that it is not.
Although “the monarch’s choice of a few subjects as those he would like to
14
Wolterstorff argues that all “secular capacities accounts” of human dignity have the
same problem in accounting for the ongoing worth of deeply incapacitated or malformed
human beings. For the details of his argument see, Wolterstorff 2008b, 323–41; for a
condensed version, Wolterstorff 2011, 148–52.
15 Wolterstorff anticipates this second sort of question in his account of bestowed worth
found in 2011, 155.

be friends with is not his way of declaring that these are the most
estimable of his subjects,” he must nevertheless detect in them “some
potential for friendship” (2011, 155). It turns out, then, that there is one
qualification placed on freely bestowed worth in this description. Bestowal
begins by some attraction to an antecedently desirable property in the
beloved: potentiality for friendship. In this way the monarch’s attachment
to his friends is not purely arbitrary.
Here, then, is the analogy to Wolterstorff’s theory of bestowed worth:
God is the monarch and “every human being has the honor of being
chosen by God as someone with whom God wants to be friends . . . every
human being has the worth that being so honored bestows on one” (2011,
155). Might God have chosen crocodiles instead? “No . . . [c]rocodiles lack
the potential for being friends with God. It’s incompatible with crocodile
nature. To be a friend with God one has to have the nature of a person.
Crocodiles at their best cannot be persons. Of all the animals, it’s only
human animals that can function as persons” (2011, 155). Although
human nature and its unique capacities, or what Wolterstorff refers to as
personhood, does not provide the worth sufficient to ground human
dignity and its corresponding rights, it is not, however, “irrelevant to a
full account of human dignity” (2011, 156). Personhood is not an “explanation of God’s desire for friendship with human beings” but it does
“make it understandable that God would choose human beings for
friendship and not the non-human animals” (2011, 156). Is dignity then
diminished if the capacities associated with personhood are degraded?
No, says Wolterstorff, dignity remains intact, upheld somehow in God’s
attachment-love.
The capacities that seem to define “personhood” and “potentiality for
friendship” are introduced into the revised version of bestowed worth in
Justice in Love in order to explain, at least partially, why the divine love
that bestows worth is not arbitrary. But this creates two problems. First,
it seems to contradict his non-capacities account of human dignity and
weaken the force of his rejection of all secular capacities-accounts found in
Justice: Rights and Wrongs, where he argues that “the secularist cannot
account” for human dignity (2008b, 361). Cannot a secularist argue that
personhood is uniquely associated with members of the human species
and that it is membership in this species that grounds dignity? In that
case, it would be species-membership, rather than divine attachment-love,
that does the work of securing dignity even in the face of the radical
impairment of capacities.
Second, and directly related to his argument in Justice in Love, the
introduction of capacities into his account of bestowed worth reveals an
internal division between divine acknowledgment of an already existent
good and investment in the good of an otherwise value-neutral object. This
tension results in a confusing picture of the relationship between love and

the good to which it tends. This, in turn, affects Wolterstorff’s account of
the compatibility of love and justice in human care-love.
The divine love requisite for understanding human value, on Wolterstorff’s description, manifests both orientations toward the good of investment and acknowledgment. The bestowed worth that grounds human
dignity is portrayed as being rooted solely in attachment-love, a mode of
investment. On further inspection, though, one finds that it is unintelligible apart from its origin in acknowledgment. So, why separate the two
for an account of human dignity that can escape capacities problems only
to reunite them later? On this description, Wolterstorff seems to have it
both ways: the divine love that bestows worth is totally unprompted and
unconditional, and is therefore a secure ground for human dignity all on
its own; yet on the other hand, divine love is as selective as the befriending monarch, favoring certain potentialities in the manner of a preferential love that Nygren would associate with erōs:
The explanation for God’s wanting to be friends with us is presumably much
like the explanation for why we want to be friends with some fellow human
being. We seek to become friends with someone not because we think he
merits it, not because his worth requires it, but because we anticipate that
our friendship will be a significant good in the lives of both of us. So too for
God’s desire to be friends with us. (2011, 156)

Wolterstorff appeals to the variation of acknowledgment involved in
friendship-love as the final description for his account of bestowed worth.
Capacities reappear in the qualification of personhood (used to ward off
the arbitrariness charge), yet they play a subordinate role to the ultimately inscrutable nature of God’s preference for human friendship—
understood as something like a perceived good in both God’s life and
humankind’s.16
The human potential for friendship with the divine and the divine
desire for human friendship seems like a suitable basis for human dignity
16 For a complementary account of the nature and reasons of divine love for humankind
see Adams 1999, 131–49. For Adams, desire for relationship stands in its own category,
beyond the dichotomy of benevolence and self-interest. The difference between their accounts
is that for Adams, the reasons for relationship need not include the belief that it will be a
significant good in the lives of either or both parties: “Even in a more beneficial relationship,
lovers prize the relationship for its own sake and not just because they believe it would be
good for one or both of them” (139). For Adams, relationship-love exhibits an orientation
toward the good that transcends (or at least is not reducible to) self-love and benevolencelove. Adams’s relationship-love exhibits the same orientation as Wolterstorff’s attachmentlove (what Wolterstorff calls investment). When applied to God’s love for humanity, Adams’s
account of the reasons for divine desire raises the same issues as Wolterstorff’s. The key
difference is that Adams does not attempt to ground human dignity solely in the worth
bestowed by divine love. For Adams’s account of the “sacred value” of human persons see
Adams 1999, 102–28.

and also a prominent theme in the Christian tradition, as Wolterstorff
suggests in Justice in Love (2011, 156–57). Yet I am not sure why
Wolterstorff is unwilling to say that the capacities connected to this
human potential for friendship with the divine—what distinguishes
human nature from crocodile nature, or what Wolterstorff calls
personhood—are not enough to ground human dignity on their own. Why
must divine attachment-love do the essential work? It is unclear how
bestowed worth inheres in the human individual and how this worth is
related to the goodness of the specifically human nature given by God in
creation. Wolterstorff’s theory assumes that God loves all human creatures in the same way and does not cease loving human creatures. Yet
what, then, is one to make of the various depictions of God’s love and
enmity in scripture? The qualification of personhood makes the divine
desire for friendship intelligible yet it also seems to clarify why God might
cease bestowing his favor and friendship when humans grossly misuse
their freedom. To root human dignity solely in divine love, rather than in
the ineradicable goodness of creation, requires too much knowledge about
God’s loves and friendships. This move, I would submit, creates a vague
theological account of what makes justice and love compatible, or concentric for practical life. Furthermore, it results in a puzzling description of
the manifestations of love and their relationship to the good.17
At the level of human love, one is left to puzzle about what sort of
acknowledgment is even involved in care-love. On the one hand, acknowledgment could consist in a theistic article of faith stating that God actively
loves every human individual and thereby grounds a worth that incomprehensibly becomes their own. Or on the other, it could be a manifestation of attraction-love—or another close variant of erōs involving
admiration of something on account of its worth—that makes justice a
proper predicate of care-love. “By incorporating justice, care joins with
eros as a manifestation of that orientation toward the good which is
acknowledgment” (2011, 144). How, precisely, do these two senses of
acknowledgment of bestowed worth come together in care-love, for Wolterstorff? The same ambiguity found in his account of divine love for
17 In his attempt to move beyond modern day agapism by appealing to a more fulsome
picture of divine love, and by explicating the relationship between love and the good,
Wolterstorff’s account has strong parallels with Vacek 1994. For each author, the final
explanation of agapē (and of all the various loves) is the good. This move simultaneously
distances them from modern agapists who display non-teleological assumptions about the
self (for example, Nygren, Niebuhr, and for Vacek, Gene Outka), and moves them closer to
classical Christian authors such as Augustine and Aquinas. This ressourcement leads Vacek
to a rich ontological conception of God as the good—and of the ordering of human love toward
that good—that is much different than Wolterstorff’s position. Although Wolterstorff posits
a necessary, explanatory relationship between love and the good, he does not entertain any
classical theological conception of God as the good. I will say more on this in section 3 below.

humankind reappears in his account of the human acknowledgment of
bestowed worth involved in care.
Wolterstorff’s way of uniting love and justice rests on his account of
bestowed worth. In human care-love there is both benefaction (well-beingpromotion) and acknowledgment of the good—a fusion of the attitudes
traditionally associated with love and justice respectively in agapist
literature. Yet in order to understand the human acknowledgment of
goodness involved in the just acts of care-love, one must first understand
the relationship between bestowed worth and the original goodness of
human nature given in creation.18 Wolterstorff must clarify this relationship in order for his account of the compatibility of love and justice to be
successful. Another example of how Wolterstorff’s account of bestowed
worth affects his account of agapē as care appears in his account of
self-love.
In a manner similar to the way that the property of human nature (and
its capacities) is somehow both constitutive and not constitutive of human
dignity for Wolterstorff, he also claims that agapism prescribes that an
agent’s own well-being is to be both pursued in care-love of another and
also to be forgotten, or at least not brought into consideration as a
condition placed on the rule for deciding when and how to act in promotion
of another’s well-being. In the next section, I turn to Wolterstorff’s opposition of care-agapism to eudaimonism, specifically to a consideration
of his rejection of eudaimonism and his incorporation of self-love into
care-agapism.

3. Self-Love in Care-Agapism
Common to all the ethical positions under consideration in Justice in
Love, according to Wolterstorff, is both a conception of human well-being
and some principle(s) for promoting the well-being of others. Love names
the ethical phenomenon of actively “seeking to promote some well-beinggood of someone or other as end in itself” (2011, 4). And the question that
must be asked of each ethical system, then, is: what principles are
available for deciding “which well-being-goods of which persons one may
or should seek to bring about, and under what conditions” (2011, 4).
Wolterstorff offers an assessment of these principles as they are expressed
in egoism, utilitarianism, and eudaimonism in order to contrast them with
18
Although Wolterstorff promises an account of divine love in terms of creation’s
goodness that goes beyond Nygren, he ultimately fails to explicate the moral status of nature
vis-à-vis the doctrine of creation. In the end he relies on an understanding of divine desire
and bestowed worth that includes a strong dose of arbitrariness. One way to deal with this
problem would be to yoke the notion of divine love to an ontological conception of God as the
good—an option Wolterstorff does not consider. This move is made, in different ways, in
Vacek 1994 and Adams 1999.

agapism. I leave to the side the details of Wolterstorff’s rejection of egoism
and utilitarianism in order to focus on his opposition to eudaimonism.
Wolterstorff rejects eudaimonism in favor of agapism on the basis of
the differing “rules of application” or “principles” found in the two
ethical systems for how to promote the well-being-goods of others as
ends in themselves (2011, 12). Eudaimonism, according to Wolterstorff,
provides principles for promoting the well-being of another as an end in
itself, yet it places a condition on them: that the promotion of another’s
well-being also be a constitutive component of the agent’s own wellbeing (2011, 5). The attention to one’s own well-being expressed in that
condition is what Wolterstorff calls the “agent-orientation” of eudaimonism. This condition disqualifies eudaimonism’s principles for promoting
the well-being of another, on Wolterstorff’s account. Agapism, he argues,
rejects the agent-well-being condition of eudaimonism and maintains
that one should seek to promote the life-goods19 of “everyone who is
one’s neighbor as ends in themselves, in the sense of ‘neighbor’ that
Jesus gave to the term” (2011, 16). And everyone is such a “neighbor,”
according to Wolterstorff.
As mentioned in the introduction above, another of the key features
that Wolterstorff suggests makes his care-agapism theoretically preferable
to benevolence-agapism is its ability to positively incorporate self-love.
And Wolterstorff presents the legitimacy of self-love in direct opposition to
Nygren’s claim that agapē roots out and destroys all natural self-love and
to Niebuhr’s claim that agapē is an impractical, self-sacrificial ideal that
risks victimization if applied at the group-level (2011, 94–97).20 The
legitimate self-love presupposed in care-agapism comes to full expression
in Wolterstorff’s second “rule of application” for care-love: “One should seek

19 “Life-goods,” for Wolterstorff, name a more expansive concept of what constitutes a
good for a human person than do “well-being-goods.” He thinks this distinction is important
because it provides a way of naming those “goods” which are “overall goods” in a person’s
life—even though they may momentarily diminish one’s well-being. Life-goods also provide
a way of naming those goods—such as rights—which do not necessarily promote or diminish
one’s well-being but are nonetheless constitutive of one’s total flourishing (for example, one’s
right to privacy). Human “flourishing” names the sort of well-being that includes these more
expansive “life-goods” on Wolterstorff’s account. See Wolterstorff 2008b, 14–15. More on this
below.
20 Wolterstorff fails to recognize a number of agapists (post-Nygren and Niebuhr) who
have also sensed the need to provide an account of proper self-love to help mitigate the
unchecked permissiveness that an emphasis on self-sacrifice might invite. Gene Outka
provides a detailed account of agapē as “impartiality” toward self and other on account their
“equal worth.” See Gene Outka 1992. See also Edward Vacek’s insistence that agapē must
always be bounded by a vivid sense of the dignity of others, including oneself in Vacek 1994.
The difference between these accounts of self-love hinges on their various ontological
accounts of human dignity.

to promote one’s own good and secure justice for oneself as ends in
themselves, though never at the cost of wronging someone” (2011, 119;
italics in original).21
Given the prominence in the modern day agapist movement of the claim that
New Testament agape is self-sacrificial, the second rule may seem surprising
coming from someone who locates himself in the agapist tradition, as I do. . . .
Note that this second rule does not merely say that it is acceptable to care
about oneself; it says one should care about oneself . . . the person who does
not care about herself thereby wrongs herself. (2011, 119–120)

Yet how does the legitimate self-love presupposed in care-agapism’s
second rule of application differ precisely from the agent-well-being clause
of the eudaimonist, which Wolterstorff rejects? To gain clarity on this
question one must have the two competing conceptions of well-being in
view. In Justice in Love, Wolterstorff dispatches eudaimonism, without
clearly defining it, on the apparent assumption that his readers will
remember how he characterized that theory’s conception of well-being in
Justice: Rights and Wrongs.
In part two of that text Wolterstorff explains how he understands
Christ’s command to love one’s neighbor as oneself to imply a total
rejection of the agent-orientation of eudaimonism: “I do not doubt that
eudaimonism is compatible with the demand to love one’s neighbor. . . .
[M]y argument is that it is not compatible with the demand to love one’s
neighbor as one loves oneself” (2008b, 208n1).
Obeying [Christ’s] command requires rejecting the agent-orientation intrinsic to eudaimonism. Though eudaimonism is not egoism in the usual sense,
nonetheless intrinsic to it is a definite “me”-ism. The condition on my
performing any action is that I judge it will enhance my eudaimonia. As long
as I continue to accept that condition on my choices, I am not loving my
neighbor as I do myself. In my choices I am not giving enhancement of my
neighbor’s well-being the same status as enhancement of my own. Only
when I give your well-being the same status in my selection of ends as my
well-being will I be loving you as I do myself. (2008b, 210–11)

On this account, the crucial difference between eudaimonism’s agentorientation and agapism resides in the love command’s requirement to put
the enhancement of the well-being of another on the same level as one’s
own.22 The eudaimonist, by contrast, must always subordinate the
21
“Wronging” in this rule refers to Wolterstorff’s specific conception of treating someone
in a way not commensurate with her bestowed worth—with a lack of respect for her dignity.
22
If Wolterstorff’s care-agapism actually requires that one put the enhancement of the
well-being of another on the same level as one’s own and give the neighbor’s well-being the
same status in one’s selection of ends as one’s own, he does not provide the relevant criteria
for deciding between the promotion of one’s well-being or the neighbor’s in situations of

enhancement of another’s well-being to the enhancement of one’s own.
“Eudaimonism allows love of other into one’s life, but only if that love
passes the test of contributing to one’s own life being well-lived” (2008b,
210).
Wolterstorff’s understanding of the ancient ethical orientation called
eudaimonism derives from Julia Annas’s The Morality of Happiness
(1993), and this in turn shapes his overall definition of eudaimonism in
both Justice: Rights and Wrongs and Justice in Love. Following Annas’s
interpretive distinction between the two dominant strands of ancient
eudaimonism—Stoic and Peripatetic—Wolterstorff notes that both schools
ultimately define human well-being (eudaimonia) in terms of virtuous
activity, no matter their debates about the role of external goods in this
regard. Wolterstorff calls this view of well-being “[the] well-lived life” and
characterizes the promotion of another’s well-being as subordinate to one’s
own eudaimonia (2008b, 149n4).
The grip of this conception of well-being and its intrinsic agentorientation had to be broken, according to Wolterstorff, in order for a
conception of justice as natural, inherent human rights to emerge. This is
a crucial turning point in his narrative in Justice: Rights and Wrongs.
Augustine of Hippo turns out to be the intellectual hero who breaks “the
grip” of the “agent-orientation of eudaimonism . . . on the thought of the
West” and who, with the resources of the Christian tradition, articulates
an alternative conception of well-being (2008b, 207–8). Wolterstorff makes
the innovative claim that Augustine’s philosophical affirmation of the
emotion of compassion in The City of God marks a fundamental departure
from the eudaimonist character of his earlier thought (2008b, 180–226).
In The City of God 14.9, Augustine rejects the Stoic characterization of
eudaimonia as a state of emotional tranquility and virtuous activity by
affirming the intrinsic goodness of the emotional disturbance of compassion. By affirming the appropriateness of compassion—understood here as
sorrowing with, or on behalf of, another—to a flourishing human life,
Wolterstorff argues, Augustine is fully parting ways with eudaimonism,
both its agent-orientation and its conception of well-being (2008b, 212–
17). Augustine’s affirmation of compassion embodies the command to love
the neighbor, for Wolterstorff, insofar as compassion is an emotion that
conflict or scarcity. As we have seen, for Wolterstorff, the requirements of care-love involve,
at the very least, honoring the dignity (and corresponding rights) of every human individual.
If one were placed in a dire situation in which honoring the worth (or some number of rights)
both of oneself and the neighbor was no longer possible, potentially Wolterstorff would
respond that there simply are no criteria to help in deciding between self-sacrifice (risking
victimization) or self-love (risking domination). On this point, Wolterstorff’s discussion of
self-love could have benefitted from conversation with Garth Hallett’s detailed account of
the variety of “rules of preference” for self and other found Hallett 1989. See also Hallett
1998.

requires one to put the well-being of another on the same level of concern
as one’s own. “Compassion is an alienation of the self from the self, a
forgetfulness of the self and an emotional identification with the other . . .
compassion is self-emptying” (2008b, 217). It is this authorization of
self-alienation from one’s own pursuit of well-being in compassion that is
the realization of Christ’s command to truly love one’s neighbor as one
loves oneself.
Augustine’s affirmation of the emotional “disturbance” of compassion in
his mature work is made possible, according to Wolterstorff, by the
significance that he assigns to the role of the “natural preferables” (a basic
category of “external goods”) in human well-being (2008b, 219). Whereas
Stoics and Peripatetics argued about whether the lack of certain external
goods could in certain cases make virtuous activity impossible, Augustine,
Wolterstorff contends, increasingly came to think that external goods (like
those that the natural preferables designate) were actually constitutive of
human well-being and not simply instrumental to the exercise of virtuous
activity. This new significance Augustine attaches to the natural preferables turns emotional disturbances like grief over one’s own misfortune and
compassion for another in their misfortune into appropriate emotional
dispositions in the formation of a good life. Wolterstorff argues that
Augustine, by the time he wrote The City of God 14.9, had come to view
the natural preferables as “genuine life-goods”—that is, as noninstrumental goods constitutive of human well-being itself and not simply
instrumental to virtuous activity. Furthermore, he suggests this indicates
Augustine’s fundamental break with ancient eudaimonism (2008b, 220).
No longer is well-being conceived solely in terms of virtuous activity (the
well-lived life), rather Augustine provides a new formulation that takes
the whole human person into view—both their actions and
circumstances—and conceives of well-being in terms of the life that goes
well (2008b, 221). “The conception of the good life implicit in Augustine’s
late thought was that of the good life as the life that goes well—what I
shall call the flourishing life” (2008b, 222).
Wolterstorff conceives of the flourishing life as a proper mixture of
rights, goods, and actions (2008b, 226).23 Certain external goods (like food
and shelter) are not just instrumental to this conception of human
flourishing, as mentioned above, they are constitutive of it (2008b, 226).
Likewise, having one’s rights to certain goods honored is also constitutive
of one’s flourishing (2008b, 226). Only in this conception of flourishing as
the well-going life, according to Wolterstorff, do rights appear. The exist23
In this passage Wolterstorff connects his definition of well-being to a broader “moral
vision” that he labels eirenéism (from the Hebrew term shalom, translated with the Greek
eirenē in the Septuagint). Although Wolterstorff’s definitions of human flourishing are
identical in both volumes, the term care-agapism replaces eirenéism in Justice in Love.

ence of rights to certain goods implies a conception of the well-going life.
The difficulty with such a conception of well-being, of course, is determining which goods count as the intrinsic “life-goods” that constitute a
“well-going life” (2008b, 227). Some theorists, such as John Finnis and
Martha Nussbaum, attempt to provide lists of the goods constitutive of
human well-being, but Wolterstorff wonders whether it is possible to avoid
this approach and provide instead a general characterization of those
goods (2008b, 227). He considers, and ultimately rejects, two prominent
philosophical strategies for arriving at such a general characterization on
the way to advancing his own: the first is representative of the utilitarian
tradition and the second comes from the natural law tradition (2008b,
228–34).
The utilitarian’s general characterization of well-being-goods in terms
of “desire satisfaction” raises the standard problem, for Wolterstorff, of
harmful human propensities. In response to this objection, some utilitarians claim that desire must first be fully “informed” if it is to count as the
type of desire that produces well-being when satisfied (2008b, 229–31).24
Yet Wolterstorff finds this further qualification insufficient: “Our human
condition is not that our desirings are all well formed but not all informed;
our desirings are themselves malformed, deformed, fallen. We need reformation, not just information” (2008b, 231). The natural law position
characterizes well-being-goods primarily in terms of proper human
functioning, a view that ultimately derives from Aristotle’s teleological
conception of human flourishing (eudaimonia) as the fulfillment of
humankind’s essential work or function (ergon). (This work is, for Aristotle, the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.) Yet, for Wolterstorff, this general characterization cannot account for many of the goods
constitutive of a well-going life that do not directly affect one’s actions or
activities (for example, the good of having one’s right to being treated in
a certain way honored). “Proper functioning radically under-determines
well-being. One cannot read the contents of well-being off our proper
functioning” (2008b, 234).25 What one needs, then, Wolterstorff suggests,
in order to give a general account of the non-instrumental, intrinsic
life-goods is a conception of the well-going life as the way a life was meant
to be (2008b, 234–37). The question, according to Wolterstorff, becomes:
Who or what determines the way a life was meant to be? In declaring
the failure of desire-satisfaction and proper-function accounts to provide
a general characterization of these goods, Wolterstorff recognizes the
difficulty involved in providing a satisfactory account. Nevertheless he
24
Wolterstorff considers the “informed desire” accounts of well-being offered by James
Griffin and Peter Railton.
25 The natural law position under consideration in this portion of the text is the view of
Mark Murphy in Murphy 2001.

ventures his own general characterization of these goods in terms of
“divine desire”: “the goods constitutive of a person’s well-being are what
God desires for that person’s life” (2008b, 236).
Thus on one end of Wolterstorff’s account of justice one finds a general
account of the intrinsic life-goods constitutive of human well-being (the
goods that humans have natural inherent rights to) in terms of divine
desire, and at the other end one discovers that the legitimacy of those
rights which are to be honored is rooted in the worth bestowed on each
individual through unconditional divine love. The explanation of this
unconditional divine love is ultimately bound up in the impenetrable
reasons of God’s desire for friendship with human persons. Wolterstorff’s
general characterization of the human good is determined by divine desire
in the same way as is his account of bestowed worth.
At the conclusion of his discussion of well-being in Justice: Rights and
Wrongs, Wolterstorff admits that his general “characterization of the
human good implies next to nothing about an epistemology of our awareness of the human good” (2008b, 237). It is regrettable that he did not say
more on precisely this point, because the divine-desire characterization of
the human good leads one back to the ambiguity at the heart of his
depiction of the relationship between divine love and the good discussed
in the last section of this essay. In what sense does the intrinsic goodness
of these life-goods inhere in the goods themselves? Can the intrinsic
goodness of life-goods be recognized or discerned through reason or desire
apart from revelation? At least with proper-function or desire-satisfaction
accounts one knows where to begin—with either human capacity or the
experience of human fulfillment.
This ambiguity in Wolterstorff’s conception of human well-being ultimately hinders his attempt simultaneously to incorporate self-love into
care-agapism and to reject eudaimonism on the basis of its agentorientation. Wolterstorff’s stark opposition to the agent-orientation of
eudaimonism presupposes that the self and other compete in a zero-sum
game over limited and indivisible goods. Yet Wolterstorff’s claim that
care-agapism allows for the coexistence of self-love and self-alienation
presupposes a non-competitive view of the promotion of another’s wellbeing as constitutive of one’s own (a possibility that he does not extend to
eudaimonism). A non-competitive view requires some appeal to a good
held in common by the self and other and of their mutual relation to it.26
Wolterstorff does not appeal to any conception of a common good and
26
This notion of a common good, and the strategy it provides for thinking about the
promotion of another’s well-being as constitutive of one’s own, is particularly prevalent in
Catholic social teaching. On this account the common good can be conceived of as some
shared material good, some form of communion, or community, or transcendent goal of
human fulfillment, or God, or some combination of these goods. See Hollenbach 2002, Porter
2005, and Stiltner 1999.

hence his attempt to dispatch eudaimonism and incorporate self-love
vacillates between competitive and non-competitive views. One way to
begin imagining the coexistence of self-love and self-sacrifice in the
pursuit of human flourishing is to think of the self and other standing in
a fundamental relation to God as the highest good. The best resources for
constructing such an account can be found, I want to suggest, in the
Christian eudaimonism of Augustine.

3.1 Augustine’s eudaimonism
As we have seen, Wolterstorff enlists Augustine in support of his
presentation of the incompatibility of the command to love one’s neighbor
as oneself and eudaimonism’s agent-orientation. However, this interpretation of Augustine’s break with the agent-orientation of eudaimonism
is dubious.27 The standard account of Augustine’s mature Christian
interpretation of eudaimonism places his eudaimonism as an intelligible
improvisation within the tradition.28 In what follows, I want to suggest
that Augustine’s writings actually present an agapistic account of eudaimonism (a possibility that Wolterstorff does not entertain) and that
Wolterstorff’s interpretation of Augustine underestimates the broader
potential of eudaimonism to resolve the tensions of love and justice.
Furthermore, I argue that Augustine’s conception of the human good is a
superior alternative to Wolterstorff’s divine desire account for thinking
about human dignity and well-being.
Wolterstorff is right to emphasize that external goods come to play an
increasingly significant role in Augustine’s later thought. In his final
systematic treatment of happiness, found in Book 19 of The City of God,
Augustine emphasizes the impossibility of achieving happiness through a
proper blend of virtuous activity and external goods. Nevertheless, happiness is still presented as the goal and it is obtained in a unique way
through the virtues of faith, hope, and love in temporal life—even if only
fully enjoyed in the flourishing of resurrected life. This future-oriented
presentation of happiness does not seem to constitute a break from
eudaimonism.
For Augustine, all of the political virtues (prudence, temperance,
courage, and justice) and theological virtues (faith, hope, and love)

27
Wolterstorff offers another rendition of his interpretation in Wolterstorff 2012. It
follows the lines of his argument in Justice: Rights and Wrongs.
28
The standard accounts, in the English-speaking world, of the relationship of Augustine’s mature thought to ancient eudaimonism are still Burnaby 1938 and O’Donovan 1980,
especially 137–159. For a recent account of Augustine’s eudaimonism in detailed conversation with agapist literature see Gregory 2008, 319–362.

ultimately cohere in just one: the love of God.29 In an argument about
happiness in Letter 155, Augustine says:
Even in this life there is no virtue except that of loving what ought to be
loved. . . . This is God; and if in loving anything else we make it preferable
or equal to him, we have forgotten how to love ourselves. The nearer we
approach to him, the better it is for us; for nothing is better than him. We
approach him, however, not by moving, but by loving. (Ep. 155.13)30

Loving God is both virtuous activity and the final end of human fulfillment. On this point, Augustine never changes his mind.
In Justice in Love, Wolterstorff identifies his care-agapism as “close to,
if not perhaps quite identical with, Augustine’s” account of human concord
found in The City of God:
First, that a man should harm no one, and, second that he should do good
to all, so far as he can. In the first place, therefore, he must care for his own
household; for the order of nature and of human society itself gives him
readier access to them, and greater opportunity of caring for them. (DCD
19.14)31

Wolterstorff does not mention, however, that this summary of the order of
concord is part of Augustine’s larger presentation of the double commandment of love and the proper extension of self-love in the formation of
human community. In the passage immediately preceding the above
quotation, Augustine says: “Now God, our Master, teaches two chief
precepts: that is, love of God and neighbor. In these precepts, a man finds
three things which he is to love: God, himself, and his neighbor; for a man
who loves God does not err in loving himself” (DCD 19.14). Throughout
The City of God Augustine presents the double commandment of love as
uniquely fulfilling the requirements of justice: “both the individual just
man and the community and people of the just live by faith, which works
by love: by that love with which a man loves God as God ought to be loved,
and his neighbor as himself” (DCD 19.23).
29 Augustine does not call faith, hope, and love “theological virtues.” This is a later
medieval development. On the Neoplatonic elements of Augustine’s unification of the virtues
in love, see Dodaro 2004. Another of the disadvantages of Wolterstorff’s misreading of
Augustine’s break from eudaimonism is that it cuts him off from Augustine’s conception of
love and justice as virtues (and the strategy for demonstrating their potential compatibility
entailed in such a conception).
30 All citations to Augustine’s City of God are noted by book and chapter number;
translations are from Augustine 1998. I have slightly amended this translation at points. All
citations to Augustine’s Epistulae are noted by letter number and section; translations are
from Augustine 2001.
31 Wolterstorff cites this passage at 2011, 139n1.

The proper interrelation of the loves expressed in the “two chief
precepts”—self-love, neighbor-love, and love of God—is a common theme
in Augustine’s work.32
A human being, then, ought to love God and himself and his neighbor with the
love commanded by divine law. However, we were not given three commandments; he did not say, “on these three,” but all the law and the prophets hang
on these two commandments, that is on the love of God, with all one’s heart and
all one’s soul and all one’s mind, and of one’s neighbor as oneself. This is so that
we grasp that the love with which someone loves himself is exactly the same
love as that which he loves God. If he loves himself in any other way, we ought
rather to say that he hates himself: for whenever someone, by turning away
from a greater and more excellent good and turning towards himself, turns
towards what is inferior and in need, he is deprived of the light of justice and
becomes unjust. Then the very true words of scripture become true of him:
Whoever loves injustice, hates his own soul [Psalm 11:5]. (Ep. 155.15)

In this passage, which is a paradigmatic instance of his eudaimonistic
interpretation of the double commandment of love, Augustine designates
God as the highest good and locates communion with God as the goal of
human flourishing—an end from which one alienates oneself by acting
unjustly.
In Augustine’s last treatment of Platonism,33 found in The City of God
Books 8–10, he notes, in full approval: “Plato says that the true and
highest good is God, and he therefore wishes the philosopher to be a lover
of God; for philosophy aims at the happy life, and he who loves God is
happy in the enjoyment of God” (DCD 8.8). From his earliest writings
until the end, Augustine never alters his presentation of the fundamental
agreement between the vision of the highest good found in Platonism and
Christianity: “For . . . the Platonists . . . assert that that which all men
desire—that is, a happy life—cannot be achieved by anyone who does not
cling with the purity of a chaste love to that one Supreme Good which is
the immutable God” (DCD 10.1).
Throughout his mature writings Augustine uses the ontological conception of God as the highest good to provide a highly nuanced account in
which self-love, neighbor-love and love of God are seen not to be in
competition with one another.34 For Augustine, any appropriate relation of
self- and neighbor-love requires first the mediation, triangulation, and
purification of love for God:
32

See Canning 1993.
The “Platonism” Augustine treats in The City of God is what one today refers to as
Neoplatonism. The preeminent “Platonists,” for Augustine, are Plotinus, Porphyry, and
Iamblichus (DCD 8.12).
34 Darlene Fozard Weaver’s hermeneutical “account of the dynamic inter-relations of love
for God, self, and neighbor” follows the broad contours of Augustine’s non-competition model.
33

We are taught to love this good with all our hearts, with all our mind and
with all our strength. We ought to be led to this good by those who love us,
and we ought to lead those whom we love to it. Thus are fulfilled those two
commandments upon which hang all the Law and the prophets: “You shall
love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your mind and with
all your soul”; and “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” For in order
that a man may know what it is to love himself, an end has been appointed
for him to which he is to refer all that he does, so that he may be happy; for
he who loves himself desires nothing else than to be happy. And this end is
attained by drawing near to God. And so, when one who already knows what
it is to love himself is commanded to love his neighbor as himself, what else
is being commanded than that he should do all that he can to encourage his
neighbor to love God? (DCD 10.3)

This passage makes clear that, for Augustine, there is no difference
between the agent-orientation of eudaimonism and the self-love presupposed in the double commandment of love. To love one’s neighbors, and
thereby to treat them justly, for Augustine, is both to act for the good
of the neighbor and to pursue one’s own well-being. To act unjustly toward
the neighbor is both to wrong the neighbor and oneself by turning away
from the highest good. Compassion, on Augustine’s account, is not an
alienation from the self, it is obedience to the double commandment of
love wherein self-love and neighbor-love are harmonized in the pursuit of
the good itself, God.
This harmonization may entail moments of genuine conflict between
the promotion of one’s own well-being and the neighbor’s. Indeed, some
cases of conflict may be insuperable and even tragic. For Augustine, one
needs a robust account of healthy self-love in the order of creation, the
contingency of servility and domination after original sin, the redemptive
power of voluntary self-sacrifice, and the future possibility of eternal
happiness in order to grasp the proper relation between love of self,
neighbor, and God. Escaping the excesses of domination or victimization
and discerning the best course of action in love requires that one view
each particular case of conflict within this full theological landscape.
Indeed, for Augustine, the unattainability of happiness and the persistence of insuperable conflict between the promotion of one’s own well-being
and the neighbor’s are intimations of a life to come—evidence of love’s
necessary relationship to faith and hope in the present age.35 Only when
(She labels her account a “contemporary ordo amoris.”) According to Weaver, this broadly
Augustinian vision of the self-other relation presupposes “dialectical tensions” rather than a
flattened sense of zero-sum competition. See Weaver 2002, 9.
35
Wolterstorff claims that all “eschatological” forms of eudaimonism entail the “implausible, even offensive” suggestion that neighbor-love is a mere means to eternal reward
(2008b, 212). This claim, once again, presupposes a competitive view of the relation between
the well-being of self and other—a view that Augustine does not hold.

love grows from genuine faith and hope, for Augustine, can it be freed for
self-sacrifice without servility and benevolence without domination.36
Elevating eudaimonism into this biblical and theological framework provides the most satisfactory account of the place of self-love and selfsacrifice within human well-being, on Augustine’s view.
Working out the full details of Augustine’s eudaimonistic argument for
the compatibility of love and justice in the double commandment of love
would require a separate essay. My point here is simply to challenge
Wolterstorff’s account of Augustine’s break with eudaimonism and to
suggest that Wolterstorff’s care-agapism is an anti-eudaimonistic variety
of agapism that has little in common with Augustine’s. This, in turn,
unsettles part of Wolterstorff’s harmonization of love and justice. Furthermore, it is unclear how Wolterstorff’s presentation of the incompatibility
of the command to love one’s neighbor as oneself and the agent-orientation
of eudaimonism in Justice: Rights and Wrongs coheres with the legitimacy of self-love presupposed in care-agapism’s second rule of application
in Justice in Love.
Augustine has a fundamentally different general characterization of the
human good than Wolterstorff. The good acknowledged in any good thing,
for Augustine, is an acknowledgment of the highest good. One can begin,
then, with the human experience of goodness and postulate the existence
of the highest good. In Augustine’s mature thought, for example, one finds
his affirmation of the innate desire for happiness that must be retrained,
reshaped, and redirected back toward its source in the supreme good.
Loves that manifest the orientation of acknowledgment need not be
viewed as competing with one another. This ontology allows him to posit
no strict separation, and no necessary competition, between love of self,
God, and neighbor. If this picture is interpreted in a reductive way, or
lifted out of its Platonic ontological framework, it may merely amount to
something like the egoism, or “me-ism,” Wolterstorff ascribes to eudaimonism. If taken in its full Christian and Platonic register, however, it
should be viewed as an innovative interpretation of eudaimonism.
Augustine’s Christian Platonism also affords him a conception of creation’s ontological participation in the good that implies a different sense of
the term given or bestowed than the one Wolterstorff entertains.37 And it
should be noted that this conception of participation provides an alternative, clearer picture of human dignity. No unconditional divine love needs
to be added on top of the property of human nature to secure a dignityground. The goodness of human nature, given in creation, is upheld in
36
Indeed, for Augustine, the relationship between love and justice is unintelligible apart
from faith and hope.
37 For an account of Augustine’s participatory view of creation contra Nygren, see
O’Donovan 1980, 157.

existence by participation in the good itself apart from any specific
knowledge of God’s various loves or enmities. The intrinsic goodness of
human nature, therefore, cannot be extinguished by diminished
capacities—whether moral or physical. This picture of dignity as intrinsic
goodness is inclusive insofar as it does not ground human worth solely in
revealed knowledge of divine love. Ontological participation in the good is
the framework by which one understands the character of revealed divine
love, for Augustine. The universality and inclusivity of this picture of
dignity is another advantage of Augustinian eudaimonism over Wolterstorff’s ethical framework. To be sure, this alternative Augustinian
account of human dignity invites its own set of questions, which unfortunately cannot be fully explored here.
Even if Wolterstorff grants me this interpretive point about Augustine,
it is conceivable that he could simply go and find the “break” with
eudaimonism elsewhere in another key historical figure. Although I do not
have the space here to work out the ways in which an Augustinian
account of the relationship between love, justice, and the good is normatively superior to Wolterstorff’s, I do want to suggest that it provides a
more satisfactory conception of neighbor-love—a love that can incorporate
the attitudes and actions associated with justice and self-love (contra
benevolence-agapism)—than Wolterstorff provides in Justice in Love.
Given Wolterstorff’s invocation of Augustine in his two-volume project,
he could have appealed to Augustine’s Christian Platonist account of God
as the highest good. That account of ontological participation could have
significantly clarified the relationship between divine love and the good in
his presentation of bestowed worth. But this is a position he refuses to
accept.38 This refusal forces Wolterstorff to characterize human worth and
well-being as contingent on the freedom of divine desire, which, in the
end, is not altogether different from the benevolence-agapism that he
opposes.
Here, then, are two key problems with Wolterstorff’s account of careagapism: First, although it promises to reveal the compatibility of love
and justice, it results in a confusing picture of the relationship between
love and the good—as it emerges in the ambiguous relationship between
38 See 2008b, 21–43, especially 26–33. The overall conception of justice as natural
inherent human rights found in Justice: Rights and Wrongs is presented by Wolterstorff as
a direct rejection of the Platonist conception of justice as “right order”—that is, justice as
rooted in cosmic and social order, oriented toward the good. Wolterstorff’s interpretation of
Augustine as breaking with eudaimonism presupposes this overarching rejection. Wolterstorff’s rejection of Platonism in his two-volume project, therefore, cuts him off from
important resources within the Christian tradition. For Wolterstorff’s brief treatment of the
Christian Platonist conception of the good and the picture of human worth that emerges
from it see 2008b, 352–57. Wolterstorff does not clarify the relationship of his bestowed
worth account of dignity to the Christian Platonist’s conception of worth as ontological
participation in the good.

bestowed worth and the goodness of creation. Second, although it promises the incorporation of self-love, it includes a conception of neighbor-love
that is somehow also an “alienation of the self from the self.” Wolterstorff
should revisit Augustine’s eudaimonistic agapism, for it is ideally suited to
deal with these two problems.
The clarity and focus of Wolterstorff’s analytical treatment of the
conceptual compatibility of love and justice should be read as a significant
contribution to the agapist tradition. However, it also brings into focus the
need for those, like myself, who stand in this tradition, to carefully
rethink the historical and normative relationship of agapism and eudaimonism in order to provide a satisfactory account of the complementary
relations between self-love and neighbor-love and love and justice. The
most promising way forward for agapism is to form a new bridge, not a
break, with eudaimonism.39
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